Dissanayake’s party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), is the main part of the National People’s Power coalition.
Anura Kumara Dissanayake won Sri Lanka’s presidential election, held on September 21, 2024. He received 42.3% of the votes, defeating his main opponent, Sajith Premadasa, who secured 32.8% of the votes.
The results are not unexpected, considering how much the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government had lost public trust.
Dissanayake’s party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), is the main part of the National People’s Power coalition.
The JVP, originally started as a revolutionary group, took part in two violent uprisings in Sri Lanka, both of which were unsuccessful—once in 1971 and again between 1987 and 1989.
India played a role in putting down the first uprising (rebellion), causing the JVP to view New Delhi as a controlling power in the region.
By the late 1980s, the party had shifted into a Sinhala-nationalist group, creating conflict with India and its large Tamil minority.
But under Dissanayake’s leadership, the JVP has changed, making it a more appealing centre-left choice.
Although people are doubtful about big changes (like completely transforming the system), they want an alternative to the powerful leaders and the IMF-backed cost-cutting measures that have made their lives harder.
Over the past year, Dissanayake put aside his previous concerns and tried to build ties with India, even praising some of New Delhi’s economic achievements.
India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, also met with Dissanayake during a recent visit to Sri Lanka.
India is likely to see Sri Lanka’s new president as a practical partner, as the JVP understands it needs to work with New Delhi.
Despite concerns in India, especially in Tamil Nadu (which has a large Tamil population of 8 crores), the JVP government’s rise in Sri Lanka is unlikely to bring major changes to India-Sri Lanka relations anytime soon due to deeper underlying factors :-
Firstly, the new government cannot afford to disregard the concerns of Sri Lankan Tamils and risk upsetting India. Doing so could result in India withholding the economic support that Sri Lanka still relies on.
India is Sri Lanka’s second-biggest trading partner, right after China, and Sri Lanka heavily depends on India for its supply of refined petroleum.
The Colombo government cannot easily switch to a different supplier, no matter how it feels about New Delhi.
Moreover, Sri Lanka’s leaders, regardless of their political views, cannot overlook the significant $4 billion aid India provided during the severe economic crisis two years ago.
Over the past decade, China has also strengthened its presence in Sri Lanka. Colombo now owes about 11% of its $51 billion external debt to Beijing.
In 2019, unable to keep up with interest payments on a Chinese-funded port in Hambantota, the Sri Lankan government had to give Beijing a 99-year lease on the facility.
With these competing influences, the new government needs to maintain strong ties with India while also not alienating China.
It’s uncertain if Dissanayake will get closer to Beijing, but relations with New Delhi have become even more important now, as India has shown it can offer crucial economic support in times of need.
So, how might India respond to the new government in Colombo? To start, New Delhi is likely to concentrate on three main issues.
i) Firstly, considering the JVP’s history, India will likely stay alert for any rise in strong Sinhala nationalism.
India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which faced some setbacks in this year’s national election and now governs in a coalition, is likely to be particularly mindful of the sentiments in Tamil Nadu, where the regional Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party is influential.
ii) Secondly, India will likely watch closely to see if the new government takes any steps to enforce the 13th Amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution, which promised to give more power to the Tamil minority—something New Delhi would support.
Out of the three main presidential candidates, only Wickremesinghe promised during the campaign that he would fully implement it.
Dissanayake chose not to mention the issue.
iii) Third, New Delhi will closely monitor how the JVP government manages its relationship with Beijing. India is becoming more concerned about China’s expanding influence in South Asia, particularly in Sri Lanka. India’s economic resources are not on par with China’s, which adds to the worry.
New Delhi will likely remind Colombo that Beijing offered little help during its 2022 financial crisis.
More importantly, even if Sri Lanka has concerns with India, India hasn’t burdened Colombo with heavy debt.
India also has reasons to maintain good relations with Dissanayake’s government. Its relationship with Nepal is unstable, it recently lost a key ally in Bangladesh after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned under pressure last month, and its ties with Pakistan have hit a deadlock.
New Delhi cannot risk new problems arising with its neighboring island nation. Luckily, India’s efforts to connect with Dissanayake before the election should help prevent this from happening.
India and Sri Lanka have experienced ups and downs in their relationship since Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) gained independence from British rule in 1948.
However, both India and Sri Lanka cannot ignore the unchanging reality of their geographic closeness and the strong ethnic ties that connect them across the Palk Strait. The Palk Strait is a narrow body of water that separates the southeastern coast of India from the northern coast of Sri Lanka.
India has to contend with China’s significant resources and growing influence in Sri Lanka from its perspective.
Therefore, India will closely watch the political decisions made by Dissanayake’s government in the coming weeks and months.
The new government in Colombo will face tough challenges, including ongoing economic problems and deep-rooted ethnic tensions, while also trying to find a balanced path between two major world powers India and China.
(The author of this article is an Aerospace & Defence Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany)
(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author’s own and do not reflect those of DNA)