The Indian strategic community is extremely wary about any apparent good news coming from the domain of Sino-Indian relations. Almost every writing and analysis on the subject and a majority of media opinion appears to point out the need for being absolutely circumspect about the prevailing trust deficit between the two countries, especially since the Ladakh standoff which began in April 2020, and more specifically after the clash at the Galwan Valley on June 15, 2020, which led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers, including a colonel.
That is perhaps the reason why there has been a cautious note to the announcement of the agreement on “disengagement and border patrolling” at the Line of Actual Control. A mix of sentiments is under expression. Yet, rarely do we find mention of the fact that there are two raging highly destabilising and destructive wars currently ongoing in Europe and the Middle East. In the midst of that, the two most populous countries of the world, both Asian, have at least moved towards rapprochement from the brink of border-related hostilities which could have led to larger conflagration four years ago and since then. An interest-based geopolitical appreciation of the emerging realities of the changing world order has at least commenced a process. That process has no major quickfire solutions but it’s a trigger for movement away from conflict and that is a healthy sign in an otherwise bleak geopolitical scenario that we have been witnessing in the post-pandemic times.
The devil may be in the details, but cynicism is the last thing that is needed now. China and India both require a change of narrative in their mutual relationship. From the highly positive period of 2014-19 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met 18 times and the graph of Sino-Indian relations rose much higher, to the sudden overnight downturn in April 2020, took most observers across the world by surprise. There was no doubt that the best thing for the world was the hand in hand progress of Sino-Indian relations. This was despite the adverse (for India) balance of trade between the two countries, creeping issues on the border that led to the 72-days Doklam standoff in 2017 and India’s blanket refusal to endorse China’s flagship measure for international outreach, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Theories yet abound on what went wrong in the spring of 2020. The early pressures of the Covid-19 pandemic were beginning to cause worry in New Delhi when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) turned direction from an ongoing military training manoeuvre in the depth areas of Tibet and deployed in tactical fashion along the perceived alignment of the LAC. A mirror deployment by the Indian Army in record time was helpful but it led to a dangerous standoff which resulted in the Galwan clash and then several meetings that only very marginally helped in reducing border tensions; the political relationship remained mired in negativity. The biggest indicator was the failure to have even a single bilateral meeting between Mr Modi and President Xi till the recent Brics meeting at Kazan in Russia. My assessment then was simply that the impending rise of India was evident from the indicators of the preceding five years before April 2020. The rapid proactivity in governance and foreign policy that Mr Modi displayed was not something China expected to come from the Indian domain. Not exactly unnerved but definitely concerned about potential strategic competition in an uncertain world, the Chinese perhaps perceived that causing a dent to the strategic confidence of a rising India may set it back sufficiently to allow China a longer span to deal with it. How this translated into military and foreign policy issues was not something that China looked at in any great detail. There was never a guarantee that the PLA could defeat the Indian Army in a border war that could expand into a general war.
The world has changed quite rapidly in the past two years with a downturn in China’s economy and the emergence of a new geopolitical order. While the Sino-Russian equation remains excellent, the same cannot be said of Sino-EU or Sino-US ties. Escalating trade tensions with the United States and other Western nations have pushed China to diversify its trade relationships, with India being a significant market that it would always prefer to have access to through a willing economic relationship, and not something akin to a compulsive transactional equation. While the US is intrinsically involved in the Ukraine conflict as a sponsor, it has also manoeuvred a strategic shift towards Asia, aimed at countering China’s growing influence. Therefore, delinking the Himalayan border from its larger security concerns would definitely be to China’s advantage too. It probably perceives that its larger goal of cautioning India has been sufficiently achieved.
For India, cynicism about expectations should be rightly expected, but do remember that a breakdown in relationships take a few moments, while re-establishing them may take years. We should fully appreciate that the “trust deficit” between the two countries is the worst it has ever been. Yet, it is a positive development because what the Chinese did to India in 2020 is being perceived by many as now being inflicted upon us by the Western world; an attempt to dilute the strategic confidence gained. The global order is never comfortable with change and especially when change affects power equations. The whole notion of India of the future being a developed nation with a developed economy and a strategic outlook, which perceives its interests from its own prism and not that of the Western world, must not be allowed an easy leeway to achieve its aspirations. This may appear to be far-fetched at this stage, but India has reason to feel pressured. An easing of tension on a long and sensitive border can only add confidence to our strategic stance. The Chinese approach to disengagement and de-escalation, while being a positive development for us, does reflect that the next few years for India will be strategically extremely challenging. Whatever we do, we cannot treat any situation as permanent. Remembering the fact that for India it is a logistics nightmare to deploy optimum strength in Ladakh, a forward placement of troops with adequate infrastructure to allow rapid deployment to prepared positions will need to be negotiated. The issue with China does not simply end with an agreement on disengagement and border patrolling. There is so much more to be done, but what has happened is good for both nations.